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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE
STATE OF UTAH
UNIVERSAL UNDERWRITERS
INSURANCE COMPANY,
a Corporation,
Plaintiff and Appellant,
vs.
ALLSTATE INSURANCE
COMP ANY, a Corporation,
Defendant and Respondent.

Case No.
11176

BRIEF OF APPELLANT
STATEMENT OF THE KIND OF CASE
This is an action by the plaintiff and appellant, Universal Underwriters Insurance Company,
against defendant and respondent, Allstate Insurance Company, to recover the amounts of money
spent by the plaintiff and appellant in settling a
personal injury action brought against Olsen Chevrolet, Inc., which was the insured under a liability
policy issued by the appellant and a liability policy
issued by the respondent.
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
Upon stipulated facts, both parties moved for
summary judgments before the Honorable Stewart
M. Hanson; and Memorandums of Law having been
submitted and argument made, the court granted
1
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the respondent's Motion for Summary Judgment
and denied the appellant's Motion for Summary
Judgment.
RELIEF SOUGHT
Appellant requests this Court to reverse the
trial court's judgment denying the appellant's Motion for Summary Judgment and granting the respondent's Motion for Summary Judgment, and
granting a summary judgment in favor of the appellant. Or in the alternative, vacate the judgment
of the lower court and return the case for the determination of any controlling issues of fact.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The parties, by their Complaint and Answer
filed herein, have agreed essentially to the following
facts:
On or about April 3, 1967, Olsen Chevrolet, a
corporation, was in the business of selling, servicing, and repairing new and used cars, with its prin·
cipal place of business in Layton, Utah. On or about
the 3rd day of April, 1967, one Ralph C. Bradbrook
had made arrangements with Walter T. Smedley,
an owner and agent of Olsen Chevrolet, to have the
Bradbrook 1965 Oldsmobile serviced at Olsen Chev·
rolet's place of business in Layton. It was agreed
that in order to accommodate Mr. Bradbrook Mr.
Smedley would leave with Mr. Bradbrook an Olso.n
Chevrolet demonstrator to be used by him while his
vehicle was undergoing repairs and servicing. The
demonstrator was left with Bradbrook, and Smedley
2
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took the Bradbrook automobile to Layton to be serviced and repaired. After the servicing and repairs
had been finished, an employee of Olsen Chevrolet
was dispatched to deliver the Bradbrook automobile
to Bradbrook and to return the demonstrator to Olsen Chevrolet. While said Michael Dean Lee was in
the process of returning the Bradbrook automobile,
he collided with a minor pedestrian by the name of
James Eccleston near the intersection of Utah Highway 232 and 2181 North Hill Field Road in Layton,
Utah. As a result of the collision, said minor,
through his father William J. Eccleston, made a
claim against Olsen Chevrolet and Michael Dean
Lee for personal injuries.
At the time of the said accident, Olsen Chevrolet, Inc., was the named insured under a liability
policy issued by the appellant, and the Bradbrook
Oldsmobile was the described vehicle under a liability policy issued by the respondent to Bradbrook.
The policy of insurance issued by the appellant to
Olsen Chevrolet limited its liability to that of secondary responsibility in situations where its agents
and employees were operating a non-owned vehicle:
"USE OF OTHER AUTOMOBILES BROAD FORM ENDORSEMENT
3. OTHER INSURANCE. This insuran~e
shall be excess insurance over any other valid
and collectible insurance for bodily injury
liability, or property damage liability and for
automobile medical payments."
The policy of insurance issued by the respondent to
3
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the said Ralph C. Bradbrook provided primary cov.
er~ge for liability arising from the use of the des.
cribed automobile subject, however, to several exclusions, the only pertinent one being the automobile
business exclusion, which provided:
"EXCLUSIONS - WHAT THIS PART OF
THE POLICY DOES NOT COVER
THIS PART ONE DOES NOT APPLY TO:
... (2) An owned automobile while used in
an automobile business ... "
And said automobile business was defined in the
said policy as follows:
" 'Automobile Business' means the business
of selling, repairing, servicing, storing or
parking of automobiles."
Responsibility for the Eccleston claim was ten·
dered to the respondent by the appellant; however,
the respondent refused to defend the claim, and the
appellant under a reservation of rights agreement
with Olsen Chevrolet proceeded to settle the claim
for $300 and in doing so incurred adjustment and
settlement expenses of $261.89.
ARGUMENT

POINT I
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GIVING EFFECT TO THE AUTOMOBILE BUSINESS EXCLUSION CONTAINED IN THE RESPONDENT'S INSURANCE POLICY INASMUCH
AS THE USE OF THE AUTOMOBILE AT THE
TIME OF THE ACCIDENT DOES NOT COME
WITHIN THE CONFINES OF THE RESPON4
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DENT'S NARROWLY DEFINED
BILE BUSINESS EXCLUSION.

AUTOMO~

Although the respondent's pleadings do not
specifically admit that the respondent's policy was
primary if the automobile business exclusion were
not to be considered, it nevertheless has been agreed
between the parties that for the purpose of this action, it is to be assumed that the respondent would
be primary if the automobile business exclusion did
not apply. Therefore, the only issue to be decided on
this appeal is whether or not under the facts stated
the respondent's automobile business exclusion allows the respondent to escape liability on the Eccleston claim.
It is the contention of the appellant that the
automobile business exclusion contained in the respondent's policy does not apply to the particular
use of the automobile at the time of the accident,
and secondly that under the circumstances the
policy is also ambiguous and therefore should be
construed against the respondent.
It is obvious that under the policy of insurance
issued to Bradbrook by the respondent that the coverage was extended to a permissive user of the named automobile and that coverage could only be avoided by a specific exclusion of the particular use of
the vehicle at the time of the accident. Such exclusions are to be construed narrowly, Cherot vs. United States Fidelity & Guaranty Company, 264 F. 2nd
767 ( 1959), and any doubts therein resolved against
5
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the insurance company issuing said policy. Stout vs.
Washington Fire & Marine Insurance Company, 14
Utah 2nd 414, 385 Pac. 2nd 608 ( 1963).
The particular automobile business exclusion
used jn the Allstate policy is ambiguous on its face
and becomes even more ambiguous when applied to
the facts in the present case. The Allstate automobile business exclusion has on numerous occasions
come before the courts for a determination of its
meaning, and the courts have found the policy to be
ambiguous and have held that the exclusion did not
apply. The case of Goforth vs. Allstate Insurance
Company, 220 F. Supp. 616, (DC North Carolina,
1964) , is on all fours with the present action. There
the owner of the private automobile had requested
the garage service station operator to repair his
automobile; and as an accommodation to his customer, the service station owner was driving the
vehicle from the owner's place of business to the
garage to affect the repairs during which time an
accident occurred. Allstate Insurance Company had
issued an automobile liability policy to the automobile owner, and subsequently denied coverage for the
accident on the basis that it was being used in the
automobile business within the confines of its exclusion. The district court held that the automobile
was not being used in the automobile business as
defined in the Allstate policy. On apoeal to the circuit court, the decision was affirmed by a per cur·
ium decision in 327 F. 2nd 637 (CA 4, 1964). The
6
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district court said as follows in holding that the use
of the vehicle at the time of the accident did not
come within the Allstate exclusion:
"Herein is the heart o fthe controversy. Counsel for defendant Allstate contends with some
ingenuity that plaintiff must choose between
the horns of a dilemma: that if the automobi!e ~as 'used' within the meaning of the perm1ss1 ve user clause of the policy it must have
been used 'in the automobile business' which
excludes coverage. This is an oversimplification and ignores the definition contained in
the policy of 'automobile business.' That business could, of course, include the transportation of motor vehicles to and from a garage
for the purpose of repairing. No such meaning (i.e. transporting) is found within the
definition, and it would have been easy to
supply. The policy was written by Allstate and
not by the additional insured Melton (service
station operator). Wherever ambiguous, it
should be read against the scrivener. Pepsi
Cola Bottling Company of Charleston and
Travelers Insurance Company vs. Indemnity
Insurance Company of North America, 318
F. 2nd 714 (CA 4, 1963). This rudimentary
rule of construction applies not only in favor
of the policyholder but also in ~av.or of ~he
additional insured, ibid. The on11ss1on to mclude transporting of automobiles along with
selling repairing, servicing, storing or parking th~m is significant, and implies an intent
not to enlarge the exclusion." Supra, page 618
The court also held that Melton was entitled to the
expenses he incurred in defending the action.
The reasoning followed by the court in the Go7
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forth decision appears to be irresistible to the pre.
sent f~cts. Not only are the facts identical, but the
same msurance company and the same provision are
also at issue. Other states presented with the same
problem as Goforth also denied effect to the Allstate
exclusion. Some of those cases are:
Capece vs. Allstate Insurance Company, 207 A
2nd 207, New Jersey (1965). In this case the own.
er had left her automobile with the service station
to be serviced. As her car was being driven into th1
service station, the plaintiff was injured. Allstatt
provided insurance for the driver of the vehicle a:
the time of the accident. As one of its grounds for
refusing to defend the case, Allstate set forth th~
automobile business exclusion. In holding that thi
exclusion did not apply, the court said:

". . A customer's automobile which is left
in the custody of the proprietor of a ser~ct
station for servicing or repairs is not berni
used in the automobile business within thi
meaning of an exclusion such as the one hen
involved ... " Supra, page 214
Wilks vs. Allstate Insurance Company, 11i
South 2nd 790, Louisiana ( 1965). The owner oi
the vehicle, Calhoun, had driven to a service stati~r
and told the owner Jacobs to wash the car and fil
it with gas.Jacobs sent his employee Dronet to dri\'i
Calhoun to his place of business and then return tn,
car back to the service station so the repairs coulr
be accomplished. ·while Dronet was driving the ca'
8
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from Calhoun's place of business back to the service station, he was involved in a collision with
"Wilks. Allstate provided coverage for the described
automobile. The trial court granted Allstate's Motion for Summary Judgment based upon the automobile business exclusion. On appeal the Supreme
Court of Louisiana reversed, holding that the automobile business exclusion in the Allstate policy did
not apply under the facts. In so holding the court
said:
"We think it is obvious from the above-discussed jurisprudence that the exclusionary
clause in the present case is at least ambiguous. The clause, 'used in the automobile business,' is certainly susceptible of at least two
meanings. It could mean ( 1) that the automobile is excluded if it is simply in the possession of the automobile business, or it could
mean (2) that the automobile is excluded
only if being driven in furtherance of the business or as a means of furnishing services to
customers, as for instance a delivery truck,
tow car, etc. It is too well settled in our jurisprudence to require citation of authority that
if an insurance policy is ambiguous, it must
be construed against the insurer." Supra,
page 794
And in the case of Allstate Insurance Company
vs. Skowinski, 189 N.E. 2nd 365, Illinois (1963),
the court held that the Allstate automobile exclusion
did not apply where an accident occurred as the car
was being driven into the service station.
It is clear from the above-cited cases that the
9

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

Allstate policy is at the very least ambiguous where
an attempt is being made to apply it under circum.
stances where the accident occurs while the auto.
mobile is being delivered either to or from the place
of service. And equally obvious is the fact that the
Allstate policy is limited to the definition which it
contains and that following the rule of strict con·
struction where coverage is being excluded, the use
of the automobile as in the present situation is out·
side the scope of the exclusion. Had the Allstate
policy contained a definition of the automobile bus·
iness which included words describing the activity
of delivering cars to and from the place of service,
then, of course, a much different situation woulU
be presented; however, such is not the case here.
Other cases involving similar fact situations
and automobile business exclusions identical with
the Allstate exclusion have also come to the samt
result. In the case of DU?nas vs. Hartford Accidenl
& Indemnity Company, 181 South 2nd 841, Louisi·
ana ( 1965), the owner of a service station had com·
pleted the servicing of the automobile and as an ac·
commodation to the owner was driving the vehicle
back to the owner's residence when he was involveo
in a collision. The insurer of the automobile, Hart·
ford, denied coverage for the reason that the car
was being used in the automobile business. The court
held that the accident occurred after completion ol
the servicing, and not while the business of servic·
ing the automobile was being performed, and that
10
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therefore the Hartford exclusion would not apply.

Lefelt vs. Nasarow, 177 A. 2nd 315, New Jersey ( 1962). There the customer's automobile was
being test driving after the repairs has been completed. The court held that it was not being used
within the meaning of the automobile business exclusion clause, which was identical with the Allstate
exclusion here.
Trolio vs. McClendon, 224 N.E. 2nd 117, Ohio
( 1967) . There the repairman had finished the repairs on the automobile and was test driving it
when the accident occurred. The automobile business exclusion contained in the automobile insured's
policy was identical to that of Allstate's policy here.
The court held that testing repairs after they had
been completed was not within the meaning of the
exclusion contained in that policy.
Western Alliance Insurance Company vs. Cox,
394 S.W. 2nd 238, Texas (1965), where it was held
that the automobile was not being used in the automobile business as defined in the policy, which was
identical with that of the Allstate policy where it
appeared that the owner had driven his car to a
service station for servicing and was then driven
back to his place of business, the accident occurring
when the service station operator's agent was driving the car from the owner's place of business back
to the service station to accomplish the repairs.
In the case of Northwestern Mutual Insurance
11
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Company vs. Great Anierican Insurance Company
404 Pac. 2nd 995, Washington ( 1966), the operato;.
of a service station had picked up the insured's automobile at his home, drove it to his service station
where he serviced it, and then while he was returning the car to the owner he was involved in a colli.
sion. The court held that the automobile was not
being used in the automobile business as defined in
the automobile business exclusion of the owner's insurance policy.
The above cases are a sampling of cases contained in 71 ALR 2nd 959 and its supplements,
which are directly in point with the present case
and have held against applying the automobile business exclusion under similar facts.
The respondent in its Memorandum of Law
filed in support of its Motion for Summary Judg·
ment relies upon the case of National Farmers Un·
ion vs. Farmers Insurance Group, 14 Utah 2nd 89,
377 Pac. 2nd 796 ( 1963), which case was reliea
upon by the lower court in granting the respondent's
Motion for Summary Judgment. Appellant respect·
fully submits that that case does not concern itseli
with the point here at issue. It merely held that a
customer using a salesman's car was not involved in
the automobile business. If anything relative to the
present situation could be gleaned from that case, it
is the statement of the court that an essential factor
in determining whether the exclusion applied wouJO
be whether or not the car was being used for a bus1·
12
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ness purpose as defined by the policy. The respondent obviously would argue that that case stands for
the proposition that if the use of the car was for a
business purpose connected with the repair and servicing of the automobile, it came within the exclusion. However, the Utah court limited business purpose by conditioning it upon 'he definition in the
policy of the automobile business. Thus we get back
to the original proposition that the liability of Allstate falls upon the application of its particular definition of automobile business to the present facts.
Obviously in the present case the use of the vehicle
was not for a business purpose inasmuch as it was
merely an accommodation to the owner. However,
even if it were said to be a business purpose to deliver the car to the owner, such facet of the automobile business was not provided for in the Allstate
definition of automobile business, and therefore said
use is outside the sphere of the exclusion.
In regards to the Universal Underwriters vs.
Strohkorb case cited by the respondent in its Memorandum of Law, that case could be readily distinguished on the basis that the vehicle was being used
to affect the repairs on it; that is, driving the car
from one location of the garage business to another
location of that business to complete the repairs. In
this regard appellant acknowledges that there have
been cases which have upheld the automobile business exclusion; however, an examination of those
cases will reveal that the facts differ from those in
13
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the present case in that the accident occurred while
the vehicle was being used directly within the defin.
ition contained in the particular policy, with some
policies being more broad than the Allstate policy,
thus providing a greater range of activities falling
within the exclusion. Appellant contends, however,
that the present cas~ is no different than the other
above-cited Allstate cases, especially the Gofort/1
case, and that the Allstate policy is ambiguous as
stated in the above-cited Wilks case, and that All·
state has restricted itself to a definition of activities
within which the delivery of an automobile after
the repairs had been completed fails to fall. It there·
fore being obvious as a matter of law that the All·
state exclusion does not apply to the use in question,
and the primary responsibility of Allstate therefore
attaches for the expenses incurred by the appellant
in settling the Eccelston claim.
Appellant therefore respectfully requests the
Court to reverse the lower court, and grant the ap·
pellant's Motion for Summary Judgment.
Respectfully submited,
HANSON & GARRETT
W. BRENT WILCOX, Esq.
520 Continental Bank Bldg.
Salt Lake City, Utah
Attorneys for Appellant
By W. Brent Wilcox
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